A local mean field analysis of security investments in networks by Marc Lelarge & Jean Bolot
A Local Mean Field Analysis
of Security Investments in Networks
Marc Lelarge
INRIA-ENS
Paris, France
marc.lelarge@ens.fr
Jean Bolot
Sprint
California, USA
bolot@sprint.com
ABSTRACT
Getting agents in the Internet, and in networks in general,
to invest in and deploy security features and protocols is
a challenge, in particular because of economic reasons aris-
ing from the presence of network externalities. Our goal in
this paper is to carefully model and quantify the impact of
such externalities on the investment in, and deployment of,
security features and protocols in a network.
Speciﬁcally, we study a network of interconnected agents,
which are subject to epidemic risks such as those caused
by propagating viruses and worms, and which can decide
whether or not to invest some amount to self-protect and de-
ploy security solutions. We make three contributions in the
paper. First, we introduce a general model which combines
an epidemic propagation model with an economic model
for agents which captures network eﬀects and externalities.
Second, borrowing ideas and techniques used in statistical
physics, we introduce a Local Mean Field (LMF) model,
which extends the standard mean-ﬁeld approximation to
take into account the correlation structure on local neigh-
borhoods. Third, we solve the LMF model in a network with
externalities, and we derive analytic solutions for sparse ran-
dom graphs, for which we obtain asymptotic results. We
explicitly identify the impact of network externalities on the
decision to invest in and deploy security features. In other
words, we identify both the economic and network proper-
ties that determine the adoption of security technologies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics; G.2.2
[Discrete Mathematics]: Graph Theory—Network prob-
lems; C.4 [Computer Systems Organization]: Perfor-
mance of Systems—Modeling techniques
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1. INTRODUCTION
Negligent users who do not protect their computer by reg-
ularly updating their antivirus software and operating sys-
tem are clearly putting their own computers at risk. But
such users, by connecting to the network a computer which
may become a host from which viruses can spread, also put
(a potentially large number of) computers on the network
at risk. This describes a common situation in the Internet
and in enterprise networks, in which users and computers
on the network face epidemic risks. Epidemic risks are risks
which depend on the behavior of other entities in the net-
work, such as whether or not those entities invest in security
solutions to minimize their likelihood of being infected. Our
goal in this paper is to analyze the strategic behavior of
agents facing such epidemic risks.
The propagation of worms and viruses [14, 6], but also
many other phenomena in the Internet such as the propa-
gation of alerts and patches [12] or of routing updates [4],
can be modeled using epidemic spreads through a network.
As a result, there is now a vast body of literature on epi-
demic spreads over a network topology from an initial set
of infected nodes to susceptible nodes. However, much of
that work has focused on modeling and understanding the
propagation of the epidemics proper, without considering
the impact of network eﬀects and externalities.
Recent work which did model such eﬀects has been lim-
ited to the simple case of two agents, i.e. a two-node net-
work. For example, reference [8] proposes a parametric
game-theoretic model for such a situation. In the model,
agents decide whether or not to invest in security and agents
face a risk of infection which depends on the state of other
agents. The authors show the existence of two Nash equilib-
ria (all agents invest or none invests), and suggest that tax-
ation or insurance would be ways to provide incentives for
agents to invest (and therefore reach the ”good” Nash equi-
librium). However, their approach does not scale to the case
of N agents, and it does not handle various network topolo-
gies connecting those agents. Our work addresses precisely
those limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we describe our model for epidemic risks with network ef-
fects and externalities. In Section 3, we introduce our Local
Mean Field Model (LMF) and state asymptotics results that
can be obtained with LMF. In Section 4, we use the LMFmodel to examine the impact of externalities and incentives
in the deployment of security features and protocols in a
network environment. In Section 5, we discuss our results
and conclude the paper.
2. A MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RISKS AND
NETWORK EFFECTS
2.1 Economic model for the agents
We model agents using the classical expected utility model,
which is named thus because it considers agents that at-
tempt to maximize a utility function u. We assume that
agents are rational and that they are risk averse, i.e. their
utility function is concave (see Proposition 2.1 in [7]). Risk
averse agents dislike mean-preserving spreads in the distri-
bution of their ﬁnal wealth.
We denote by w the initial wealth of the agent. The risk
premium π is the maximum amount of money that one is
ready to pay to escape a pure risk X, where a pure risk X
is a random variable such that E[X] = 0. The risk premium
corresponds to an amount of money paid (thereby decreasing
the wealth of the agent from w to w − π) which covers the
risk; hence, π is given by the following equation: u[w−π] =
E[u[w + X]].
Each agent faces a potential loss `, which we take in this
paper to be a ﬁxed (non-random) value. We denote by p the
probability of loss or damage. There are two possible ﬁnal
states for the agent: a good state, in which the ﬁnal wealth
of the agent is equal to his initial wealth w, and a bad state
in which the ﬁnal wealth is w − `. If the probability of loss
is p > 0, the risk is clearly not a pure risk. The amount of
money m the agent is ready to invest to escape the risk is
given by the equation: pu[w − `] + (1 − p)u[w] = u[w − m].
We clearly have m > p` thanks to the concavity of u. We
can actually relate m to the risk premium deﬁned above:
m = p` + π[p].
An agent can invest some amount in self-protection, which
in practice would reﬂect an investment in antivirus or anomaly
detection/prevention solutions. Each agent has a binary
choice regarding self-protection: if it decides to invest in
self-protection, we say that the agent is in state S (as in
Safe or Secure). If the agent decides not to invest in self-
protection, we say that it is in state N (Not safe). If the
agent does not invest, its probability of loss is p
N. If it does
invest, for an amount which we assume is a ﬁxed amount c,
then its loss probability is reduced and equal to p
S < p
N.
In state N, the expected utility of the agent is p
Nu[w−`]+
(1−p
N)u[w]; in state S, the expected utility is p
Su[w −`−
c]+(1−p
S)u[w−c]. Using the deﬁnition of risk premium, we
see that these quantities are equal to u[w−p
N`−π[p
N]] and
u[w − c − p
S` − π[p
S]], respectively. Therefore, the optimal
strategy is for the agent to invest in self-protection only if
the cost for self-protection is less than the threshold
c < (p
N − p
S)` + π[p
N] − π[p
S]. (1)
2.2 Epidemic model
We describe now our model for the epidemic risk. Agents
are represented by vertices of a graph. We assume that an
agent in state S has a probability p
− of direct loss and an
agent in state N has a probability p
+ of direct loss with
p
+ ≥ p
−. Then any infected agent contaminates neigh-
bors independently of each others with probability q
− if the
neighbor is in state S and q
+ if the neighbor is in state N,
with q
+ ≥ q
−.
Special cases of this model are examined in [9], where
q
+ = q
−, and in [10], where agents in state S are completely
secure and cannot be infected, i.e. p
− = q
− = 0.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph on a countable vertex set V .
Agents are represented by vertices of the graph. For i,j ∈ V ,
we write i ∼ j if (i,j) ∈ E and we say that agents i and j are
neighbors. The state of agent i is represented by Xi; agent
i is infected (respectively healthy) iﬀ Xi = 1 (respectively
Xi = 0).
We now describe the fundamental recursion satisﬁed by
the vector X. We ﬁrst introduce the following sequences of
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
(r.v.):
• (A
S,A
S
i ,i ∈ N) are Bernoulli r.v. with parameter p
−;
• (A
N,A
N
i ,i ∈ N) are Bernoulli r.v. with parameter p
+;
• (B
S
i ,B
S
ji,i,j ∈ N) are Bernoulli r.v. with parameter
q
−;
• (B
N
i ,B
N
ji,i,j ∈ N) are Bernoulli r.v. with parameter
q
+.
Let Di = 1 if agent i is in state S and Di = 0 otherwise.
We deﬁne
φi = DiA
S
i + (1 − Di)A
N
i .
The variable φi models the direct loss: if φi = 1 there is a
direct loss for agent i, otherwise there is no direct loss for
agent i. We also deﬁne
θji = DiB
S
ji + (1 − Di)B
N
ji.
The variable θji models the possible contagion from agent j
to agent i: if θji = 1, there is contagion otherwise there is
no contagion.
Then the fundamental recursion satisﬁed by the vector
X = (Xi,i ∈ V ) is
1 − Xi = (1 − φi)
Y
j∼i
(1 − θjiXj). (2)
2.3 Epidemic risks for interconnected agents
In order to completely specify our model, we still need to
deﬁne how to choose the variables Di, i.e. whether agent i
invests in self-protection (corresponding to Di = 1) or not
(Di = 0).
First, note that the probability of loss for agent i is given,
depending on whether or not it invests in self protection, by
p
S
i := E[Xi|Di = 1]
p
S
i = 1 − E
"
(1 − A
S
i )
Y
j∼i
(1 − B
S
jiXj)
#
, or, (3)
p
N
i := E[Xi|Di = 0]
p
N
i = 1 − E
"
(1 − A
N
i )
Y
j∼i
(1 − B
N
jiXj)
#
. (4)
In view of (1), the best response of agent i is given by:
Di = 1 1(ci < (p
N
i − p
S
i )`i + πi[p
N
i ] − πi[p
S
i ]), (5)where p
S
i and p
N
i are given by (3) and (4).
Our model is deﬁned by the graph G (which topology is
arbitrary) and the set of Equations (2,3,4,5). In the rest of
this paper, we will make a simplifying assumption: we con-
sider a heterogeneous population, where agents diﬀer only
in self-protection cost and potential loss. The cost of protec-
tion should not exceed the possible loss, hence 0 ≤ ci ≤ `i.
The cost ci and the potential loss `i are known to agent i
and varies among the population. Hence we model this het-
erogeneous population by taking the sequence (ci,`ii ∈ N)
as a sequence of i.i.d. random variables independent of ev-
erything else.
So far, we have not yet speciﬁed the underlying graph.
We will consider random families of graphs G
(n) with n ver-
tices and give asymptotic results as n tends to inﬁnity. In
all cases, we assume that the family of graphs G
(n) is inde-
pendent of all other processes.
3. LOCAL MEAN FIELD MODEL
In this section, we introduce our Local Mean Field (LMF)
model. It extends the standard mean-ﬁeld approximation by
allowing to model the correlation structure on local neigh-
borhoods. It can be shown that the LMF gives the exact
asymptotic behavior of the process X as the number of ver-
tices tends to inﬁnity for sparse random graphs with asymp-
totic given degree distribution P(d) (see [5] for a deﬁnition).
A rigorous proof of this fact can be found in [9] for a par-
ticular case of the model described in Section 2.2. We will
not attemp to give a general proof here. The main tool is
the notion of local weak convergence [2].
3.1 Exact results for trees
Since the graphs we are considering can be considered lo-
cally to be like trees (with high probability), we ﬁrst examine
the case where G = T is a tree with nodes ,1,... and a ﬁxed
root .
For a node i, we denote by gen(i) ∈ N the generation of i,
i.e. the length of the minimal path from to i. Also we denote
i → j if i is a children of j, i.e. gen(i) = gen(j) + 1 and j is
on the minimal path from to i. For an edge (i,j) ∈ E with
i → j, we denote by Ti→j the sub-tree of T with root i when
deleting edge (i,j) from T. We have a family of trees Ti→j
and we run the epidemic model according to equation (2)
with the same variables (B
S
i ,B
N
i ,B
S
ij,B
N
ij,ci,`i,i,j ∈ N) on
each tree. Hence the epidemics on the various subtree of T
are coupled thanks to these random variables. We say that
node i is infected from Ti→j if the node i is infected in Ti→j.
We denote by Yi the corresponding indicator function with
value 1 if i is infected from Ti→j and 0 otherwise. A simple
induction shows that the recursion (2) becomes:
1 − Yi = (1 − φi)
Y
k→i
(1 − θkiYk). (6)
If the tree T is ﬁnite, we can compute all the Yi recursively
starting from the leaves with Y` = φ` for any leaf `. As a
consequence (and this is the main diﬀerence with (2) which
makes the model on a tree tractable), the random variables
Yk with k → i in the right-hand term of (6) are independent
of each others and independent of the θki. For any node
i ∈ T, we just deﬁned Yi and the family (Yi,i ∈ T) is a
tree-indexed process called a Recursive Tree Process (RTP).
Consider now the case where T is a Galton-Watson branch-
ing process with oﬀspring distribution P
∗. The tree T is now
possibly inﬁnite but it is still possible to deﬁne an invariant
RTP on T. One way to construct it consists in deﬁning a
RTP for each ﬁnite depth-d tree and then show that these
RTPs converge to an invariant RTP as the depth d tends to
inﬁnity [1]. We ﬁrst introduce the Recursive Distributional
Equation (RDE):
Y
d = 1 − (1 − φ)
N∗ Y
k=1
(1 − θkYk), (7)
where N
∗ has distribution P
∗, φ = DA
S + (1 − D)A
N,
θk = DB
S
k + (1 − D)B
N
k where D is a Bernoulli r.v. with
parameter γ, Y and Yk are i.i.d. copies. We also assume
that the random variables D, A
S, A
N, B
S
k , B
N
k and Yk are
independent of each others. Note however that φ and the
θ’s are not independent of each others. RDE for RTP plays
a similar role as the equation µ = µK for the stationary
distribution of a Markov chain with kernel K, see [1].
Proposition 1. For γ < 1 or p
− > 0, the RDE (7) has
a unique solution: Y is a Bernoulli random variable with
parameter h(γ), the unique solution in [0,1] of
h = 1 − γ(1 − p
−)GN(1 − q
−h) − (1 − γ)(1 − p
+)GN(1 − q
+h)
where GN∗(x) = E[x
N∗
] is the generating function of the
distribution P
∗. Moreover the function γ 7→ h(γ) is non-
increasing in γ.
As a consequence, we see that it is possible to construct an
invariant version of the RTP on the tree T where for each
k ≥ 0, the sequence (Yi,i ∈ T,gen(i) = k) is a sequence of
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter h, see [1].
3.2 LMF associated to a random network
Our LMF model is characterized by the connectivity dis-
tribution P(d) but the underlying tree T as to be slightly
modiﬁed compare to previous section: if we start with a
given vertex then the number of neighbors (the ﬁrst gener-
ation in the branching process) has distribution P but this
is not true for the second generation. Let T be a Galton-
Watson branching process with a root which has oﬀspring
distribution P and all other nodes have oﬀspring distribu-
tion P
∗ given by P
∗(d − 1) =
dP(d) P
dP(d) for all d ≥ 1.
Remark 1. Note that if P is the Poisson distribution
with parameter λ which is the asymptotic degree distribution
for Erdos-Renyi graph G(n,λ/n), then P
∗ is also Poisson
with mean λ.
We now explain how to deﬁne the LMF based on the analysis
made in previous section. Clearly, the crucial point in recur-
sion (6) is the fact that the Yi can be computed“bottom-up”.
However a node can also be infected from its parent and Yi
is NOT a good approximation of the real process Xi. Indeed
the only node for which previous analysis gives an approxi-
mation of the process X is for the root and the Yi’s encode
the information that the root is infected by an agent in the
subtree of T “below” i.
Hence we deﬁne
X(D)
d = 1 − (1 − φ)
N Y
k=1
(1 − θkYk), (8)
where N has distribution P, φ and θk are the same as in (7)
and the Yk’s are i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with parameter h(γ),
i.e. satisfying the RDE (7) with N
∗ having distribution P
∗.3.3 Asymptotic results
We now show how to get quantitative results from our
LMF. The goal of Section 4 is to derive such results for
various cases.
We consider a family of random graphs on n vertices G
(n)
and the associated process (X
(n)
i ,i ∈ {0,...,n−1}) satisfy-
ing the equations of our model on G
(n). We assume that our
family of random graphs converges locally to a tree as de-
scribed in previsous section. This property is true for sparse
random graphs [2]. It can be shown that the process X
(n) is
asymptotically equivalent to the process deﬁned on the tree,
i.e. the corresponding LMF model described in previous sec-
tion [9]. Hence we restict our analysis to the LMF model
and the quantities computed here correspond to the asymp-
totic values of the corresponding quantites for the process
X
(n) for large values of n.
Let γ be the fraction of the population investing in self-
protection. Then by symetry, the random variables Di are
i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with parameter γ. Thanks to the results
of the previous section, we can compute the law of the Xi’s.
From this law, we can compute the corresponding probabil-
ity of loss depending on the choice made to invest or not.
Then one has to check self-consistency: the fraction of the
population for which the best-response consists in invest-
ing in self-protection should be γ. Hence to solve our LMF
model, we need to solve the following ﬁxed point equation:
p
N,γ = E[X(D)|D = 0]
= 1 − E
"
(1 − A
N)
N Y
i=1
(1 − B
N
i Yi)
#
, (9)
p
S,γ = E[X(D)|D = 1]
= 1 − E
"
(1 − A
S)
N Y
i=1
(1 − B
S
i Yi)
#
, (10)
c
γ = (p
N,γ − p
S,γ)` + π[p
N,γ] − π[p
S,γ], (11)
γ = P(c ≤ c
γ), (12)
where the distribution of X(D) is given by (8) or equiva-
lently the Yi are i.i.d. Bernoulli r.v. with parameter h(γ)
given by Proposition 1.
Let γ
∗ be a solution of this ﬁxed point equation. Then we
have the following interpretations: γ
∗ is the fraction of the
population investing in self-protection, p
N,γ∗
is the prob-
ability of loss for an agent not investing in self-protection
and p
S,γ∗
is the probability of loss for an agent investing in
self-protection. Hence the average probability of loss is
E[X(D)] = γ
∗p
S,γ∗
+ (1 − γ
∗)p
N,γ∗
.
The outcome of rational behavior by self-interested agents
can be inferior to a centrally designed outcome. By how
much? The price of anarchy, the most popular measure of
the ineﬃciency of equilibria, is deﬁned as the ratio between
the worst objective function value of an equilibrium of the
game and that of an optimal outcome (possibly centralized
in which case it will not be described by the model intro-
duced above). In our setting, the cost incurred to agent i is
ci +p
S
i `i +πi(p
S
i ) if it invests in security and p
N
i `i +πi(p
N
i )
otherwise. So for a given equilibrium, we can compute the
total cost incurred to the population. The price of anarchy
is the ratio of the largest (among all equilibria) such cost
divided by the optimal cost. The price of anarchy is at least
1 and a value close to 1 indicates that the given outcome is
approximately optimal. We refer to [11] for an introduction
to the ineﬃciency of equilibria (in particular chapter 17).
We show in the next section how to compute this price of
anarchy.
4. NETWORKEXTERNALITIES ANDTHE
DEPLOYMENTOFSECURITYFEATURES
We next use our LMF model to compare the following
situations:
• Case 1: Strong protection. If an agent invest in self-
protection, it cannot be harmed at all by the actions
or inactions of others: p
− = q
− = 0 (this is as in [10])
• Case 2: Weak protection. Investing in self-protection
does not change the probability of contagion: q
+ = q
−
(as in [9])
In both cases, agents that invest in self-protection incur some
cost and in return receive some individual beneﬁt through
the reduced individual expected loss. But part of the beneﬁt
is public, namely the reduced indirect risk in the economy
from which everybody beneﬁts. Hence, there is a negative
externality associated with not investing in self-protection,
namely the increased risk to others.
4.1 Erdos-Renyi graphs
We analyze our model on a large sparse random graph
G
(n) = G(n,λ/n) on n nodes {0,1,...,n − 1}, where each
potential edge (i,j), 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n−1 is present in the graph
with probability λ/n, independently for all n(n−1)/2 edges.
Here λ > 0 is a ﬁxed constant independent of n. This cor-
responds to the case of the Erd¨ os-R´ enyi graph which has
received considerable attention in the past [5]. As explained
in Section 3, our analysis is not restricted to this class of
graphs, but it is simpler in this case since the degree distri-
bution P is a Poisson distribution with mean λ (see Remark
1).
In this case, the ﬁxed point equation for h(γ) in Proposi-
tion 1 becomes:
h = 1 − γ(1 − p
−)e
−λq−h − (1 − γ)(1 − p
+)e
−λq+h.
Then the equations (9) and (10) are given by:
p
N,γ = 1 − (1 − p
+)e
−λq+h(γ),
p
S,γ = 1 − (1 − p
−)e
−λq−h(γ).
For simplicity, we drop the risk adverse condition, so that
π ≡ 0 and we assume that costs for the self-protection are
the same for all agents and equal to c, and the possible losses
are also the same and equal to `. Then we have
c
γ =
￿
(1 − p
−)e
−λq−h(γ) − (1 − p
+)e
−λq+h(γ)
￿
`.
Recall that an agent decides to invest in self-protection iﬀ
c < c
γ. The monotonicity of c
γ in γ is crucial and it depends
on the value of the parameters (p
+,p
−,q
+,q
−).
4.2 Case 1: Strong protection
We ﬁrst consider Case 1 where p
− = q
− = 0, so that
p
S,γ = 0 and c
γ = p
N,γ` =
￿
1 − (1 − p
+)e
−λq+h(γ)
￿
`. Then
by Proposition 1, γ 7→ c
γ is non-increasing and the ﬁxedc/l
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Figure 1: Price of anarchy for c/` in the vicinity of
p
+ = 0.01.
point equation (9,10,11,12) has a unique solution. In this
case, as γ the fraction of agents investing in self-protection
increases, the incentive to invest in self-protection decreases.
In fact, it is less attractive for an agent to invest in self-
protection, should others then decide to do so. As more
agents invest, the expected beneﬁt of following suit decreases
since there is a reduction in the negative externalities which
translates into a lower probability of loss. Hence there is a
unique equilibrium point which is a Nash equilibrium. How-
ever, there is a wide range of parameters for which the Nash
equilibrium will not be socially optimal because agents do
not take into account the negative externalities they are cre-
ating in determining whether to invest or not. Indeed it is
easily shown that at least for c > p
+`, the price of anarchy
is strictly larger than one (see Figure 1).
Proposition 2. The ﬁxed point equation (9,10,11,12) re-
duces to
h =
h`
c
￿
1 − (1 − p
+)e
−λq+h
￿
and, γ =
h`
c
.
It has a unique solution. The price of anarchy is given by
Pa(c) = sup
γ
c
γc + h(γ)`
,
where h(γ) is the unique solution of
h = (1 − γ)
￿
1 − (1 − p
+)e
−λq+h
￿
4.3 Case 2: Weak protection
We now consider Case 2 where q
+ = q
−, so that γ 7→ c
γ is
non-decreasing. The analysis of this case is described [9] (see
Proposition 5). The situation is quite diﬀerent from the re-
sults we derived for Case 1 above. In particular, we can have
two Nash equilibria involving everyone or no one investing
in security. When there are two Nash equilibria, the socially
optimal solution is always for everyone to invest: each agent
will ﬁnd that the cost of investing in self-protection will be
justiﬁed if it does not incur any negative externalities and
society will be better oﬀ as well.
Proposition 3. We have c
0 < c
1 and
• if c < c
0, then there is only one Nash equilibrium where
every agent invest in self-protection;
• if c > c
1, then there is only one Nash equilibrium where
no agent invest in self-protection;
• if c
0 < c < c
1, then both Nash equilibria are possible.
The price of anarchy is given by:
Pa(c) = sup
γ
h(0)`
γc + h(γ)`
,
where h(γ) is the unique solution of:
h = 1 − (1 − γp
− − (1 − γ)p
+)e
−λqh.
If we take p
− = 0, then we have h(1) = 0 and h(0) = h
∗
solution of h
∗ = 1 − (1 − p
+)e
−λqh∗
. So that we have
Pa(c) ∼
h
∗`
c
.
Figure 2 shows the value of h
∗ as a function of λq
+. Note
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Figure 2: Price of anarchy: h
∗ as a function of λq
+,
with p
+ = 0.01 and p
− = 0.
that typically c = o(`) so that the price of anarchy can be
substantially larger than one.
5. DISCUSSION
We have shown that both situations with strong or weak
protections exhibit externalities and that the equilibrium is
not socially optimal: therefore, there is a market failure.
However there are several important diﬀerences to under-
stand between strong and weak protections before trying to
resolve this market failure.
In case 1, the situation is similar to the free-rider problem
which arises in the production of public goods. If all then
agents invest in self-protection, then the general security
level of the network is very high since the probability of loss
is zero. But a self-interested agent would not continue to
pay for self-protection since it incurs a cost c for preventing
only direct losses that have very low probabilities. When
the general security level of the network is high, there is no
incentive for investing in self-protection. This results in an
under-protected network.
Note that in this case, if the cost for self-protection is not
prohibitive, there is always a non-negligible fraction of the
agents investing in self-protection. In case 2, the situation is
quite diﬀerent since no agent at all invests in self-protection.
Even if a small fraction of agents does invest, and so raises
the general level of security of the network, it is not suﬃcient
for the beneﬁt obtained by investing in self-protection for a
new agent to be larger than the cost of self-protection.
These facts seem very relevant to the situation observed
in the Internet, where under-investment in security solutionsand security controls has long been considered an issue. Se-
curity managers typically face challenges in providing jus-
tiﬁcation for security investments, and in 2003, the Presi-
dent’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace stated that
government action is required where ”market failures result
in under-investment in cybersecurity” [13].
It shows the power of our basic model to note that these
interesting and very relevant phenomena emerge from our
analysis. Note also that these phenomena correspond to
two extreme values of the parameter q
−, namely case 1 cor-
responds to q
− = 0 and case 2 corresponds to q
− = q
+.
Hence taking p
− = 0 and ﬁxing all other parameters, we
have a family of models indexed by q
−, denoted simply q in
what follows, which varies ’continuously’ between the two
cases.
Recall that q is the probability of contagion when the
agent invests in self-protection. If q = 0, the agent is com-
pletely secure whereas for q = q
−, agents have the same
probability of contagion whatever their choices to invest or
not in self-protection. Hence q can be interpreted as the in-
verse of the quality of the technology used for self-protection.
First note that when q = 0, the technology is ’perfect’
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Figure 3: Adoption curves
since there is no possible loss. We are in the situation of
case 1 and we see that due to purely economic reasons, the
technology is under-deployed in the network because people
’free-ride’ the beneﬁt of the technology. Consider now the
case of an arbitrary q. Figure 3 shows the adoption curves
for diﬀerent values of q. This curve shows the fraction of
the population investing in security technology as a func-
tion of its cost (normalized by the loss). Other parameters
are p
+ = 0.01,q
+ = 0.5 and λ = 10.
We observe some counter-intuitive phenomena. First for a
ﬁxed price, increasing the quality of the security technology
can lead to a decrease of its adoption in the population! Here
is a qualitative interpretation of how this arises: when the
technology is not very good, propagation of the epidemic is
possible even if the agent uses the technology. Then agents
have to pool their eﬀorts in order to compensate for the
weakness of the technology. In other words, a large number
must invest in self-protection in order to have an acceptable
level of security. But when the technology becomes better,
then agents that did invest in it start to step down from the
group of investors and choose to free-ride.
Second there is a barrier for choosing self-protection (ex-
cept when q = 0). Namely for a ﬁxed q, we see that there is
a range for the parameter c (close to c
0) such that the popu-
lation is ’trapped’ in state N whereas for the same values of
the parameters, the situation where a large fraction of the
population is investing would be a sustainable equilibrium
point. There is a possibility of tipping or cascading: induc-
ing some agents to invest in self-protection will lead others
to follow suit. The curves of Figure 3 allow us to quantify
the minimal number of agents to induce in order to trigger
a large cascade of adoption.
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